The impact of audit opinion on cost of debt: Evidence from Vietnam
Nguyen Vinh Khuong et al. Ho Chi Minh City Open University Journal of Science, 11(1), 83-93
83
The impact of audit opinion on cost of debt:
Evidence from Vietnam
Nguyen Vinh Khuong1*, Nguyen Thi Lan Huong1, Vy Bao Chau1, Nguyen Ton Huong Mai1,
Nguyen Le Cam Thi1, Cu Tong Hoai Linh1
1Faculty of Accounting and Auditing, University of Economics and Law, Vietnam National
University Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam
*Corresponding author: khuongnv@uel.edu.vn
ARTICLE INFO
ABSTRACT
DOI:10.46223/HCMCOUJS.
econ.en.11.1.1067.2021
We consider whether the category of audit opinion an
enterprise receives is pertained to the cost of debt of Vietnam
corporations and how does it impact them. Proceeding from the
data collected from 80 listed companies in the Vietnam stock
exchange in the period of 2007 - 2017, we used a quantitative
method to demonstrate the negative impact of modified audit
opinion on the cost of debt. When companies receive a modified
opinion, they have to pay higher interest rates and have a shorter
maturity. From the results, this paper suggests some
implications for the financial statement disclosure of listed firms
and regulators in order to contribute to the transparency of the
financial reports.
Received: September 29th, 2020
Revised: January 12th, 2021
Accepted: January 18th, 2021
Keywords:
audit opinion, cost of debt, listed
company, Vietnam
1. Introduction
When internal funds are not enough for daily operations and investments, companies tend
to seek external equity (loans) or borrowings. “Debt is easier access and more popular for all
businesses than selling company shares for the capital call.” (B. C. Liu, 2016). In Vietnam, raising
capital is very regular and popular, but sometimes not all of the capital-raising processes go
smoothly and bring success to companies (Dinh & Tran, 2019). In order to gain external capital,
companies are required to provide financial information, most needed are the annual financial
statements (Shivakumar, 2013; Watts, 1986). But how do users trust in the provided information?
One way to ensure the reliability of the published financial statements is using an autonomous
audit process.
Previous studies have shown that audited financial statements are considered more
valuable, more reliable and more widely acceptable than unaudited financial statements (Minnis,
2011). Auditors may issue different types of opinions to reflect the different reliability levels of
financial statements. The unqualified audit opinion is the most common, in which the auditor
indicates that the financial statements present a true and fair view in all material respects, and
becoming dependable. The more reliable it is, the more creditors (e.g., banks) provide credit to
companies with beneficial terms (e.g., lower interest rates, longer maturity) (Ding, 2016). In
contrast, the modified opinion is considered to be the cause of the less favorable debt terms (P. C.
Chen, 2016). The reliability of the audited financial statements may also change based on who is
the auditor, which auditing firms, but the larger firms (Big 4) are more reliable (Gong, 2016).
According to (H. Liu, Cullinan, & Zhang, 2018), based on auditing standards, a modified opinion
may notify both financial difficulties (which creditors can detect from financial results even
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Nguyen Vinh Khuong et al. Ho Chi Minh City Open University Journal of Science, 11(1), 83-93
without financial statements) and lack company planning management. In addition, the modified
opinion is also an indication that this financial information may be unreliable. The audit opinion
also reduces the prestige of the financial statements such as the unqualified audit opinion with the
explanatory paragraph, qualified and adverse audit opinion. Explanatory paragraph leads to
unfavorable loan terms (P. C. Chen, 2016) and may signal the possibility of future errors (Czerney,
Schmidt, & Thompson, 2014). Few studies have the topic of modified or adverse audit opinion
because of their infrequent nature, but they are likely to have a stronger influence on the reliability
of the financial statements than the unqualified opinion with an explanation.
Based on these insights, we believe that modified audit opinion can reduce the creditor’s
credibility about firm’s financial ability, the reliability of management’s plans in order to solve the
financial problems and reliability of the financial statements, all of the above may make the
characteristics of the debt less favorable including higher interest rates and shorter debt maturity.
Higher interest rates lead to greater interest expenses over the life of the loan. A shorter loan term
requires the borrower to pay the loan quickly, potentially making it harder for companies to repay
and higher transaction costs when the debt is refinanced. With greater reliability when the audit
opinion comes from a larger firm, the relationship between the modified opinion and the debt
agreement will be stronger when the firm is audited by a larger firm.
The team chooses to research the topic “The impact of audit opinion on the cost of debt:
Evidence from Vietnam” in order to provide more practical evidence on the relationship between
audit opinion and the debt characteristics of listed companies in Vietnam with an aim of helping
companies make easier to access external capital and help investors make appropriate decisions.
2. Theoretical and hypothetical basis
The Agency Theory was researched in the early 1970s, focusing on asymmetric
information in relation to contracts of the insurance company (Ross, 1973). Jensen and Meckling
(1976) defined a representative relationship as a contractual relationship, shareholders (owners)
will appoint others as business managers (the agent) including the empowerment to make a
decision to determine the assets of the business. Adverse selection and Moral hazard exist because
of conflicts in ownership division and asset management rights in the firms. Conflicts of interest
between shareholders and agent exist when the shareholders expect all activities of the agent for
maximizing their welfare, meanwhile, the agent can act on everything that brings profits to his
own regardless of the consequences the business can incur. The shareholders can know that the
business activities can be through the financial statements, which will reduce the risk of whether
the agent is fulfilling the long-term goals that bring benefits to the business or not. The way that
can partially solve the problem that Agency Problem is to provide financial statements of the
financial activities of the business to shareholders. The second Agency Problem is between
creditors and shareholders. Individuals and organizations with money will hand over to
shareholders of a joint-stock enterprise, they will represent to make the investment that benefits
both of them. When deciding to lend, creditors often afraid that businesses will invest in high-risk
projects or undesirable activities that lead to the possibility of failing to get money back, thus
refusing to grant more capital or offer a higher interest rate than the market rate to offset the risk
of capital loss. The disclosure of financial statements will protect the rights of creditors against the
debtor’s financial risks. The financial statement will increase the reliability of the information,
thus making the information more transparent, making it easier for borrowers to participate in the
credit market.
Because asymmetric information issue not only occurs in insurance companies but also in
many other markets. Therefore, the initial signaling theory was developed to clarify this problem
Nguyen Vinh Khuong et al. Ho Chi Minh City Open University Journal of Science, 11(1), 83-93
85
in the labor market (M. Spence, 1973). The initial signaling theory was developed to clarify the
problem of asymmetric information in the labor market (M. Spence, 1973). As a result of the
asymmetric information problem, enterprises are increasingly trying to demonstrate their resources
and potential development to outperform other businesses to attract investment and improve their
reputation (Verrecchia, 1983). Enterprises are willing to disclose more information than required
by law to affirm operation quality (Campbell & Mutchler, 1988). To highlight the quality of
business operations, enterprises often assert their position through information disclosure which
helps stakeholders assess the difference in performance between different businesses. Therefore,
the level of information disclosure depends heavily on the level of enterprise development such as
business scale, revenue and growth rate.
In order to facilitate capital raising for businesses, managers often do not want to disclose
fully and accurately the information that is detrimental to the loan, thereby providing bad
information that adversely affects the bank’s lending decision. In other words, the asymmetry of
information leads to inaccurate decisions. The auditor is one who can reduce that asymmetric
information for banks. To certify the financial statements clearly presenting the financial position
of the business in all material respects, signaling to the bank that it can make a loan decision based
on the information. In this case, the auditor will give an unqualified opinion on the financial
statements of that enterprise. On the contrary, if the auditor gives a modified audit opinion,
meaning that the company’s financial reporting may not have presented the actual and accurate
financial results, banks need to consider more information, check information received and the
conditions of the business clearly. From that, it can be seen that the opinion of the auditor greatly
influences the bank’s lending decision. The firm that accepts the modified audit opinion has less
favorable debt characteristics than the unqualified opinion one.
Modified audit opinions may take the form of varying degrees of severity (P. C. Chen,
2016; Cullinan, 2012; Li & Wu, 2004), which can accommodate different signals to banks. The
modified audit opinions regarding continued operability results in a higher cost of equity capital
(Amin, 2014), and that investors will react drawback if those audited opinions are exposed (Khan,
2017).
Audit opinion mentioning going concern not only has significant doubts about the firm’s
financial ability but also about management has a lack of appropriate and feasible plans to deal
with uncertain things, so businesses will have less favorable debt characteristics, it’s mean that
businesses will have difficulty in borrowed capital. For auditing opinions related to Going concern
modifications are considered above. Affecting the debt characteristics of the business, there are
still three types of modified opinions. In unqualified opinions with an explanatory paragraph,
although it does not change the conclusion that financial statement is fair, this explanatory
paragraph may lead to adverse market reactions (Pei & Hamill, 2013), and there will likely be
mistakes in the future (Czerney et al., 2014). For the qualified opinion, the auditor indicates that
the financial statements stating financial ability of the firm, business results, cash flow, which are
free from material misstatements, “except for” specific transactions or balances, or circumstance,
the financial statements present fairly “except for” some area in Financial Statement. If sufficient
evidence of the information on the financial statements cannot be obtained, it is not possible to
determine whether the financial statement is presented fairly (or give a true and fair view), the
auditor may "refuse to express an opinion", the auditor may issue a disclaimer of opinion. The
most serious of audit opinions is an adverse audit opinion, concluding that it implies wrongdoing
or unreliable accounting practices, and it does not present fairly. An adverse opinion is also a “red
flag” for investors and can have negative effects on stock prices. Both types: adverse opinions and
disclaimers are signals that the financial statements are presented unfairly, dishonestly and may
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not be reliable for creditors and banks, so it is possible to predict the impact strongly influence
debt characteristics. To summarize, the change between the reciprocal relation between the
modified audit opinions and debt characteristics will be based on the type of audit opinion: adverse
opinions/disclaimers has a stronger relationship with the debt characteristic than qualified opinions
and has a stronger correlation with the debt characteristic than unqualified opinions with an
explanatory paragraph. Therefore, we propose a hypothesis as follows:
H1: The unqualified audit opinion has an inverse relationship to the debt characteristics
of businesses
Control variables
The higher the total value of tangible fixed assets (PPE - plant property and equipment)/
Total assets, the higher the cost of debt will be. Small and medium-sized businesses can use
tangible assets as collateral to ensure they are unable to pay debts or worse than bankruptcy. For
large enterprises, the value of tangible fixed assets is quite large, most of them are machinery and
land, and investors may have difficulty in liquidating these assets, if they really need to loan, this
debt will be quite large when compared to smaller businesses. the company’s annual operating
activities net cash flow/total assets (CFO), the more effective an activity is (except in the case of
large investments), the less they need for loans is thus reducing the interest expense. Firm size
(Size), The bigger the size of the business, the more opportunity managers will have to boost
production, investment and business development as the market grows. leverage of the firm (Lev)
is calculated by the logarithm of the total debt divided by the total assets when the total debt of a
business is high, the cost of capital is also high, the creditor will consider when lending to the firm
which has low market value because if businesses do not pay the debt, the recovery will be less, if
lending, the business will likely have to borrow at a higher interest rate than the rates that large
businesses have to pay. Firmage - is the number of years of operation of the business. SOE -
State-owned enterprise.
3. Research methods
3.1. Data
We use data from Datastream of Thomson Reuters in the Center for Economic and
Financial Research at the University of Economics and Law to collect data. The sample was
selected by the method of non-probability random sampling. The author uses the Rand between
the arithmetic function to get a random sample. For each Enter, the author will select a stock code,
and keep continuing until the selected securities number is completed. The sample selected by the
author is 80 companies including 30 companies listed on HOSE and 23 companies on HNX and
27 companies UPCOM.
We collected the data of companies in the petrol and electronics industry and excluded
those in the financial investment and banking companies since they are dominated by industry
factors. The companies selected as models have all the necessary indicators for the calculation,
all-sufficient audited financial statements, debt contracting and annual reports are published during
the research period.
Methodology
Previous studies have used quantitative methods, in particular, used linear regression
analyst in accordance with panel data. In this study, we have reused that method to consider, assess
the impact of audit opinion on interest expenses of listed businesses in Vietnam. Our author team
selected 80 eligible listed businesses on the Vietnamese stock exchange, specifically, the audited
Nguyen Vinh Khuong et al. Ho Chi Minh City Open University Journal of Science, 11(1), 83-93
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and published financial statements, annual report for 11 years from 2007 to 2017. Because
secondary data has been tested, screened and highly reliable, so we skip the verification of
confidence coefficient and use Stata software to run regression models.
After conducting descriptive statistics and correlation analysis, this study uses OLS
regression analysis to determine whether independent variables significantly affect the interest
expenses of listed firms. Because of using panel data, we must resolve whether to use Fixed Effect
Model (FEM) or Random Effect Model (REM). To select suitable models, both fixed-effects
models (FEM) and random effects models (REM) were used to estimate the coefficients in the
models. Afterward, we conduct a Hausman test with the assumption: REM model is more
appropriate. The test results show us which model is more suitable to provide more useful
regression results.
Next, using Modified Wald and Wooldridge test to detect if variance change and
autocorrelation phenomenon occurs or not. If the tests are violated, we will use Robust correction
to overcome the variance change phenomenon and the autocorrelation phenomenon. After that,
our author team conducted analysis of the regression results, discuss the interactions between the
variables and the causes of influence. From there, we draw the conclusion for the research.
3.2. Research models
The authors inherited the research model of H. Liu et al. (2018) to measure the impact of
audit opinion on interest expenses of listed businesses in the Vietnam stock exchange. The analysis
model is recommended as follows:
IntRateit=0+1AOit+2PPEit+3CFOit+4Sizeit+5Levit+6SOEit+7Firmageit+t+t+it
In which:
(1)
i = 1, 2, 3, ..., 80 (with i is the representation for 80 listed enterprises individually).
t = 1, 2, 3, ..., 11 (with t is the 11-year period from 2007 to 2017 individually).
IntRate i,t - The dependent variable, which measures the cost of debt of the firm i at the
point time t, is calculated by dividing the interest expenses by dividing the total liability.
AO - Independent variable, identify observations that the auditor gives the modified audit
opinions on the financial statement of enterprise i at the point time t; AO takes the worth of 1
means modified audit opinions, and 0 if unqualified opinion.
PPE - Control variable, which represents the total worth of tangible fixed assets of
enterprise i at time t, (PPE = ln (Cost of tangible fixed assets / Non-current and current assets)).
CFO - Control variable, based on the net cash flow from operating activities divided by
the non-current and current assets of enterprise i at time t.
Size - Control variable, showing the size of the enterprise by the worth of non-current and
current assets of the firm i at time t, (SIZE = ln (Non-current and current assets)).
Lev - Control variable, viewing the leverage ratio of the firm at time t, (LEV = ln (Total
liabilities / Non-current and current assets).
SOE - Control variable, representing state-owned enterprises.
Firmage - Control variable, measure the number of years has been operating of the
enterprise i at time t.
δ 1, δ 2, … δ 7 - Regression coefficients measure the level of change in the cost of debt
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per unit of change of the independent variable, controlled variables when the value of other
independent variables and control variables are constant.
εit - is a random error.
4. Research results
4.1. Descriptive statistics
Table 2
Descriptive statistics
Variable
IntRate
AO
N
Mean
0.029
0.884
0.092
0.328
0.502
27.042
0.415
4.095
Std. Dev.
0.031
0.321
0.179
0.246
0.206
1.351
0.227
2.798
Min
0.000
0.000
−0.446
0.000
0.015
24.169
0.000
0.000
Max
0.218
1.000
1.903
0.959
0.952
31.624
0.806
12.000
473
473
473
473
473
473
457
411
CFO
PPE
Lev
Size
SOE
Firmage
Source: Data analysis from author’s calculation
Pursuant to explanatory statistics of all variables, audit quality by Big4 enterprises of listed
enterprises fluctuates from 0 to 1 with an average of 0.883721 in the period 2007-2017. CFOs of
listed enterprises fluctuates from - 0.44648 to 1.902682 with an average of 0.092406 in the period
2007-2017, which shows the ratio of cash flow earned on assets of the companies are having
trouble. The worth of tangible fixed assets of listed enterprises ranges from 0 to 0.959368 with an
average of 0.32791 in the period from 2007-2017. Financial leverage changes from 0.014607 to
0.951684 with the means of 0.502096 in the period of 2007-2017, representing that the firms using
liabilities accounted for a large percentage in the capital structure. The firm size gives an outcome
is from 24.16904 to 31.62452 with an average of 27.04248 in the period 2007-2017. State charter
capital of listed companies change from 0 to 0.8058 with the means of 0.415295 in the period of
2007-2017, which means the state does not contribute much to the charter capital, companies are
forced to find other sources of capital from borrowing. The number of years of operation of listed
enterprises fluctuates from 0 to 12 with an average of 4.095.
4.2. Correlation analysis
Table 3
Correlation matrix
IntRate
1.000
-0.069
AO
CFO
PPE
Lev
Size
SOE
Firmage
IntRate
AO
1.000
0.122 -0.008
0.026 -0.092
1.000
0.150
CFO
PPE
1.000
-0.029 -0.131 -0.099 -0.113
1.000
Lev
Nguyen Vinh Khuong et al. Ho Chi Minh City Open University Journal of Science, 11(1), 83-93
89
IntRate
AO
CFO
PPE
0.027
Lev
0.534
Size
1.000
0.028
0.243 -0.106
SOE
Firmage
0.016 -0.099 -0.093
-0.071 -0.009 -0.005
Size
0.262 -0.141
0.104
1.000
SOE
-0.114
0.131 -0.080 -0.079
1.000
Firmage
Source: Data analysis from author’s calculation
A correlation matrix is displayed in Table 3 indicates that AO is negative related to IntRate
models.
4.3. Regression analysis results
Table 4
Results of FGLS regression analysis of model
Variable
AO
Coefficient
-0.009
Std. Error
0.002
z-Statistic
-4.11
4.82
Prob.
0.000
0.000
0.773
0.409
0.158
0.006
0.000
0.711
0.021
0.004
CFO
PPE
0.001
0.003
0.29
0.004
0.005
0.82
Lev
0.001
0.001
1.41
Size
-0.009
0.003
-2.77
-3.99
0.37
SOE
-0.001
0.000
Firmage
Cons
0.007
0.019
79.59
0.000
Chi2(7)
Prob > Chi2
Source: Data analysis from STATA software (version 14.2)
The author team uses the estimation method of panel data to select which model is more
effective between REM and FEM to consider if there is autocorrelation between residuals and
independent variables. However, this method gives similar results, we continue to use the
Hausman test to select the suitable model.
With P-value = 0 <0.05, we proved that using REM model is more suitable. Then, we
continue to perform some other tests: LM test - Breusch and pagan Lagrangian.
Multiplier - Heteroskedasticity test of REM models, Wooldridge test to test the
autocorrelation phenomena in the data table. The result shows variance change and autocorrelation
phenomena are violated on the data table. Hence, the research team used Robustness regression to
overcome the above two phenomena. Finally, we perform the FGLS regression model to
consolidate and minimize the variance change in the research model.
Table 4 displays the regression results connected with the relationship between audit
opinions and interest expense in the 2007-2017 period of enterprises listed on the stock market in
Viet Nam.
The result shows there are 4 variables - AO, CFO, SOE and Firmage have statistical
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Nguyen Vinh Khuong et al. Ho Chi Minh City Open University Journal of Science, 11(1), 83-93
significance at 1%, therefore only these 4 variables have a significant impact on the cost of debt
of companies. The FGLS test indicates that - audit opinion factors - AO, cash flow from operating
activities of companies - CFO and number of years operation of companies - Firmage, these factors
have a consistent and significant statistical effect on the interest expenses of the business.
Moreover, research results expose that the AO has a negative impact on the interest expense and
at 1% statistical significance, thus H1 hypothesis is accepted.
This result is consistent with previous research, particularly from P. F. Chen, He, Ma, and
Stice (2016) and H. Liu et al. (2018). An audit opinion is an important factor in determining
whether the interest expense a company will incur is high or low. The unqualified opinion will
make the companies more favorable for loans and just bear relatively low-interest expenses.
Besides, the research results also show other factors affecting the cost of debt, including
observation variable that the auditor presents a modified audit opinion (AO) - opposite impact,
rate of cash flow earned on assets (CFO) - same impact, control variables signify to state-owned
enterprises (SOE) - opposite impact, control variables represent the number of operation years of
companies (Firmage) - opposite impact. All of the factors listed are statistically significant in the
research model.
5. Conclusions, meanings, and limitations
5.1. Conclusions
The research model is built to test the hypothesis by following the research of H. Liu et al.
(2018). All analytical procedures (for example, statistics describing variables, univariate and
multivariate analysis, polynomial tests) are performed using Stata statistical software.
The final results of the research clearly prove the initial hypothesis that the audit modified
opinion has an inverse relationship with the debt characteristics consistent with the results of (H.
Liu et al., 2018). At the same time, answering the question “How does the audit opinion affect the
interest expenses of listed companies?”. An audit opinion is an important factor in determining
whether the interest expense that a company will incur is high or low. An unqualified opinion will
make the company more favorable for loans and will only bear relatively low-interest expenses.
Research by P. C. Chen (2016) shows that such additional paragraphs are related to less
approving loan terms. According to Gong (2016), the reliability of the audited financial statements
may also vary contingent on who is the auditor, which larger accounting companies often
considered to be more reliable. This research supports previous researches and the results are
similar. We stated there is an inverse relationship between the modified opinion and the
convenience of the loan terms. The modified opinion of the financial statements may reduce the
convenience of the loan. This finding supports the hypothesis of the study. However, the research
does not avoid shortcomings and limitations. The research paper only takes data from a certain
field and a single country, as well as time, which is limited. So, we hope that this research will be
used as a reference for other researches to be more complete and able to overcome.
5.2. Recommendations
From the above research results, we would like to make some recommendations for listed
companies and Government Agency as follows:
For listed company
The information on the financial statements plays an important role for all companies in
general and listed companies in particular. It shows the financial year of the company and is the
basis for analysts, investors, banks relying on to analyze the financial condition of a company. A
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financial statement that has been audited by big auditing firms always makes more faith for
analysts, investors and banks. However, this doesn’t mean that an investor’s trust is absolute to a
financial statement being audited. In addition, a financial report is nothing without trust from the
second party. The confidence of an investor, a bank creates a lot of motivation for the development
of the stock market, especially when the Vietnam stock market is still young. Therefore, the
research team would like to make some recommendations as follows:
Firstly, companies need to focus on disclosing financial statements information
transparently and clearly: timely, quality of financial statements information, and above all
choosing a reputable auditing firm credibility, professionally and reliably.
Secondly, companies need to choose an appropriate and effective communication method
to widely publicize financial statements for investors and those who are interested in it, which
increases openness and transparency and make it easy for the public to access the information.
Thirdly, accountants and administrators shouldn’t or refrain from applying accounting
methods intentionally to falsify financial statements information or affect the stock price of
companies or investors’ decisions, especially using accounting estimates. For example, at present,
companies use many methods to increase profits, reduce costs, “distort” the data to window
dressing. Moreover, they explain the financial statements in a transient, inadequate way to hide
bad information, contingent liabilities, and recorded dishonest and reasonable amounts.
For government agency
The duty of the state is to establish, manage stability and develop the stock market. In order
to achieve this goal, the Government agency must perform the management to increase investment
efficiency and attract new investors, potential investors, ...They must increase market liquidity and
manage transparency issues such as auditing quality, time of publishing financial statements,
controlling negative behaviors to increase the effectiveness of the market. According to the
research results, the disclosure of financial statements of listed companies that have been audited
by Big4’s auditing firms, which affects the cost of debt. This will help the financial statement
information reflect the relationship between audit opinion and debt terms or cost of debt, thereby
increasing the efficiency to stabilize and develop the market.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
This research is funded by the University of Economics and Law, Vietnam National
University Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam.
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93
APPENDIX
The stock market code of 80 companies that we collected
Stock
market
code
Stock
market
code
Stock
market
code
Stock
market
code
Firm
Firm
Firm
Firm
APP.HN
ASP.HM
APP
ASP
GEX.HM
GSM.HNO
GSP.HM
GEX
GSM
GSP
PLC.HN
PLX.HM
POV.HNO
PPS.HN
PLC
PLX
POV
PPS
RAL.HM
SFC.HM
SII.HM
RAL
SFC
SII
BDW.HNO BDW
BTW.HN BTW
HFC.HNO
HFC
HPW
HTC
KHP
SWC.HNO SWC
TDM.HNO TDM
BWA.HNO BWA HPW.HNO
PPY.HN
PSB.HNO
PSC.HN
PSD.HN
PTH.HNO
PTS.HN
PPY
PSB
PSC
PSD
PTH
PTS
PVC
PVD
PVE
CAV.HM
CCI.HM
CAV
CCI
HTC.HN
KHP.HM
TDW.HM
TGP.HNO
TIE.HM
TDW
TGP
TIE
CKV.HN
CLW.HM
CMI.HN
CMV.HM
CNG.HM
COM.HM
DHP.HN
DNC.HN
CKV KHW.HNO KHW
CLW LAW.HNO
CMI LKW.HNO
CMV MTG.HNO
CNG NBW.HN
LAW
LKW
MTG
NBW
TMC.HN
TSB.HN
TYA.HM
UIC.HM
TMC
TSB
TYA
UIC
PVC.HN
PVD.HM
PVE.HN
PVG.HN
PVP.HNO
PVS.HN
PVT.HM
PWS.HNO
PXS.HM
PXT.HM
COM NTW.HNO NTW
VAV.HNO VAV
DHP
DNC
PAC.HM
PCG.HN
PGC.HM
PGD.HM
PGS.HN
PGT.HN
PJC.HN
PAC
PCG
PGC
PGD
PGS
PGT
PJC
PVG VCW.HNO VCW
PVP
PVS
VIP.HM
VIP
DNW.HNO DNW
VLW.HNO VLW
DOP.HNO
DQC.HM
DTV.HNO
DOP
DQC
DTV
PVT VMG.HNO VMG
PWS
PXS
PXT
VSP.HNO
VTB.HM
VTO.HM
VSP
VTB
VTO
GDW.HNO GDW
11 trang
19/04/2022
2000
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