Determinants affecting tax compliance: A case of business households in Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam

136 Khuc D. Nam, Nguyen T. B. Minh. Ho Chi Minh City Open University Journal of Science, 11(1), 136-152  
Determinants affecting tax compliance:  
A case of business households in Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam  
Khuc Dinh Nam1*, Nguyen Thi Binh Minh1  
1Nong Lam University, Vietnam  
*Corresponding author: [email protected]  
ARTICLE INFO  
ABSTRACT  
DOI:10.46223/HCMCOUJS.  
econ.en.11.1.984.2021  
This paper aims to identify key factors influencing the tax  
compliance of business households in Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam.  
The researchers surveyed 215 owners of business households in Ho  
Chi Minh City from June 2020 to July 2020. Analysis of the model  
includes the 4 phases following: (i) Applying the expert  
methodology; (ii) Cronbach’s test for reliability of the scale and  
exploratory factors analysis (EFA); (iii) Pearson correlation  
coefficient analysis; (iv) Regression analysis and hypothesis test of  
a model. The results of this study revealed that factors affecting tax  
compliance of business households in Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam  
in descending order of importance: Tax Rate, Tax Knowledge, Tax  
Penalty, Personal Norm, and Perceived Fairness (of the system).  
Moreover, the tax rate had a negative relationship with tax  
compliance and the others had a positive one with tax compliance.  
Finally, the research also proposes some implications to enhance  
tax compliance of business households and directions for further  
research.  
Received: September 21st, 2020  
Revised: January 14th, 2021  
Accepted: January 18th, 2021  
Keywords:  
tax compliance, business  
households, personal norm, tax  
rate, tax knowledge  
1. Introduction  
In Vietnam, business households are also one of the important economic sectors  
contributing to Vietnam’s economy. However, the General Statistics Office of Vietnam showed  
that there were more than 5.6 million business households in 2018, but according to the General  
Department of Taxation’s data, the whole country had just over 1.7 million business households  
having tax payments in 2018. Statistics from the General Department of Taxation show that from  
2015 to 2018, the tax revenue collected from business households only increased slightly over the  
years, while the proportion of contribution to the state budget decreased. Ho Chi Minh City is an  
economic, financial, commercial, and service center of the country, and is the nucleus of the  
southern key economic region. With a high economic growth rate, the city size accounts for only  
0.6% of the area and 8.3% of the population but has contributed 20.2% of the gross national  
product and one-third of the State budget every year. Therefore, Ho Chi Minh City is home to  
many business households that provide accommodation services as well as other services related  
to the residents such as catering, entertainment, and essentials, etc.  
Although tax compliance has been researched for a long time, the factors influencing tax  
compliance are very different among different countries and individuals. Moreover, most of the  
previous studies are done in developed countries having comprehensive infrastructure and a stable  
tax law system and the number of tax compliance research in developing countries like Vietnam  
is low in numbers. Particularly, no study has been reported to identify determinants impacting on  
Khuc D. Nam, Nguyen T. B. Minh. Ho Chi Minh City Open University Journal of Science, 11(1), 136-152 137  
tax compliance of business households in Vietnam although the role of business households is  
important to Vietnam’s economy. Therefore, this study “Determinants affecting tax compliance:  
A case of business households in Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam” is the first study on tax compliance  
of business households in Vietnam to fill the gap and is very necessary and meaningful in current  
Vietnam’s economic conditions. The results of the study provide a framework for assessing the  
impact of determinants on tax compliance of business households to help tax authorities to come  
up with appropriate tax management policies for business households. Moreover, the study also  
proposes some recommendations that can help the tax authorities propose solutions to enhance tax  
compliance of business households in Ho Chi Minh City in particular and in Vietnam in general.  
The main objective focuses on: (i) a literature review of factors affecting tax compliance, (ii)  
identifying determinants impacting on tax compliance of business households in Vietnam, and (iii)  
policy implications.  
2. Literature review  
2.1. The definition of tax compliance  
For a long time, many researchers have tried to define tax compliance. For example,  
Allingham and Sandmo (1972) defined tax compliance as reporting all actual income. Andreoni,  
Erard, and Feinstein (1998) showed that tax compliance related to the willingness of taxpayers to  
accomplish the tax laws, to truly report tax bases to correctly calculate the tax liability, to file tax  
returns on time, to pay tax on time, and to fulfill all tax procedures and obligations without  
enforcement. Kirchler (2007) defined tax compliance as the willingness of taxpayers to pay their  
taxes. Similarly, according to the reports of IRS (2009), ATO (2009), LHDN (2009), tax  
compliance related that taxpayers comply with the tax law willingly, pay the tax fees on time, and  
declare correctly their income. In our research, tax compliance concerns that taxpayers comply  
with the tax laws willingly, declare their income correctly, file their tax report on time, and pay all  
their tax fees on time.  
2.2. Tax compliance theories  
2.2.1. The economic deterrence theory  
The economic deterrence theory states that tax compliance is affected by the tax rate, the  
probability of audits and penalties, the evasion’s benefits (Allingham & Sandmo, 1972). The  
taxpayers only pay the tax because of their fears of punishment and detection. Conversely, with  
low penalties and low audit probabilities, tax evasion is high. Therefore, the tax administration  
needs to develop enforcement strategies to increase tax compliance.  
2.2.2. The fiscal exchange  
The fiscal exchange theory suggests that government expenditures (such as public goods  
and services) may encourage tax compliance (Alm, McClelland, & Schulze, 1992). If individuals  
recognize that their tax fees are necessary both to help finance the public goods and services and  
to get others to contribute, they may pay tax fees (Fjeldstad & Semboja, 2001). Particularly, the  
existence of positive benefits, the taxpayers will comply voluntarily, without direct coercion.  
2.3.3. Social influence theory  
In social influence theory, tax compliance behavior is affected by the behavior and social  
norms of an individual’s reference group such as relatives, friends, and neighbors (Keith, 1990).  
Thus, taxpayers may evade taxes if they know many people in groups important to them who also  
have tax evasion. By contrast, a good social relationship may help deter individuals from evading  
tax because of fear of the social sanctions imposed situations discovered and revealed publicly.  
138 Khuc D. Nam, Nguyen T. B. Minh. Ho Chi Minh City Open University Journal of Science, 11(1), 136-152  
2.2.4. Comparative treatment  
The comparative treatment model shows that the equity theory and equity in the exchange  
relationship between government and taxpayers may lead to improving tax compliance  
(McKerchar & Evans, 2009). Citizens not only consider their relationship with the state but also  
compare the state’s treatment with them and their fellow citizens. Therefore, this theory highlights  
the importance of fairness treatment in the research of tax compliance.  
2.3. Determinants of tax compliance  
Previous studies have shown that many determinants affect tax compliance. Allingham and  
Sandmo (1972) established the basic economic tax compliance model based on some factors that  
are audit, penalty, and tax rate. Jackson and Milliron (1986) summarized 14 key factors that  
effecting on tax compliance. These factors are arranged into a single integrated model known as  
Fischer’s model (Fischer, Wartick, & Mark, 1992). It consists of demographic factors,  
noncompliance opportunity factors, attitudes and perceptions factors, and tax system structure.  
After that, this model was modified by Chau and Leung (2009) and it was supplemented with  
cultural factors and the relationship between the tax system and noncompliance opportunity.  
Kirchler (2007) indicated that the three main groups influencing tax compliance were social-  
psychological determinants (e.g., attitudes, norms, fairness perception); political determinants  
(e.g., complexity of law and tax system, fiscal policy); economic determinants (audits, fines, tax  
rate, income). Ngo, Vu, and Tran (2019) showed that 3 key factors influencing tax compliance of  
enterprises in Vietnam, including tax knowledge, tax penalty, and tax inspection. Based on a  
combination of previous studies and findings of our research, the authors have proposed a model  
for tax compliance of individual business households in Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam including 5  
groups: (i) Tax Knowledge, (ii) Tax Systems, (iii) Tax Administration, (iv) Norm, and (v)  
Perceived Fairness (of the tax system).  
The research model is shown in the following Figure 1:  
Tax Knowledge  
Tax Rate  
H3 +  
Tax Penalty  
Tax Compliance  
Personal Norm  
Perceived Fairness  
Figure 1. The proposed research model  
2.3.1. Tax Knowledge (TK)  
Tax Knowledge is also a key factor affecting tax compliance. Eriksen and Fallan (1996)  
indicated that “tax attitudes can be improved through better tax knowledge”, and as a result, tax  
compliance could be enhanced and tax evasion could be reduced. Niemirowski, Wearing, and  
Baldwin (2003) showed that there was a positive relationship between tax compliance and tax  
knowledge.  
Some researchers revealed that higher tax knowledge led to rising tax compliance  
(Clotfelter, 1983; Groenland & Van Veldhoven, 1983; Wahlund, 1992; Kirchler & Maciejovsky,  
2001; Park & Hyun, 2003). Based on the experimental study, Eriksen and Fallan (1996) indicated  
Khuc D. Nam, Nguyen T. B. Minh. Ho Chi Minh City Open University Journal of Science, 11(1), 136-152 139  
that if the students were taught the tax laws in their class, they could be more compliant with the  
tax, and tax evasion could be decreased. Moreover, Kirchler, Hoelzl, and Wahl (2008), Palil and  
Mustapha (2011), and Ngo et al. (2019) also revealed that higher tax knowledge led to higher  
compliance.  
Therefore, we had this hypothesis:  
H1: Tax Knowledge has a positive (+) impact on tax compliance  
2.3.2. Tax Rate (TR)  
Clotfelter (1983) and Slemrod (1985) revealed a negative relationship between tax rate and  
compliance. Lower compliance at a high marginal tax rate is reported by Lang, Nöhrbaß, and Stahl  
(1997) for German taxpayers, by Weck-Hannemann and Pommerehne (1989), and by  
Pommerehne and Weck-Hannemann (1996) for Swiss taxpayers. Moreover, Hai and See (2011)  
and Tilahun (2018) found that the high rate cause high tax noncompliance.  
This hypothesis was then constructed:  
H2: Tax rate has a negative (-) impact on tax compliance  
2.3.3. Tax Penalty (TP)  
According to Allingham and Sandmo (1972), increasing the penalties led to enhancing tax  
compliance. A significant relationship between the severity of criminal sanction and tax  
compliance was found by Witte and Woobury (1985), and by Hasseldine, Hite, James, and Toumi  
(2007). Ngo et al. (2019) indicated that there was a positive relationship between tax compliance  
and tax penalty.  
This hypothesis was then constructed:  
H3: Tax penalty has a positive (+) impact on tax compliance  
2.3.4. Personal Norm (PN)  
Personal norms include personality factors, moral standards, values, religious beliefs,  
authoritarianism, and Machiavellianism, etc. The moral standards on tax were improved and  
developed as a result of voluntary compliance (Baldry, 1987; Jackson & Milliron, 1986; Trivedi,  
Shehata, & Lynn, 2003). Empirical studies show that Machiavellianism furthers tax evasion  
(Adams & Webley, 2001; Kirchler & Berger, 1998; Webley, Cole, & Eidjar, 2001), but tax  
compliance is enhanced by community values and altruistic orientation or personal norm  
(Braithwaite, 2003; Blamey & Braithwaite, 1997).  
Therefore, this hypothesis was constructed:  
H4: Personal norm has a positive (+) impact on tax compliance  
2.3.5. Perceived Fairness (of the tax system) (PF)  
Wenzel (2003) indicated that three dimensions of perceived fairness of the tax system  
impact tax compliance including procedural justice, distributive justice, and retributive justice.  
The taxpayers are more compliant when the tax system is perceived to be fair (Alm, Jackson, &  
McKee, 1993; Azmi & Perumal, 2008; Richardson, 2005; Tilahun (2018), while if taxpayers  
perceive that the tax system is unfair, they tend to evade tax. (Allingham & Sandmo, 1972; Etzioni,  
1986; Spicer & Lundstedt, 1976; Scott & Grasmick, 1981).  
Therefore, this hypothesis was then constructed:  
140 Khuc D. Nam, Nguyen T. B. Minh. Ho Chi Minh City Open University Journal of Science, 11(1), 136-152  
H5: Perceived fairness (of the tax system) has a positive (+) impact on tax compliance  
3. Research methodology  
The process of our research for determinants influencing tax compliance of business  
households in Vietnam has 4 phases following:  
Phase 1: The expert methodology was used and we invited 20 lecturers training tax and  
20 experts as group discussion to improve the scale and design of the questionnaire. After that,  
we created a list of determinants gathered from the literature review as mentioned in the above  
studies.  
Phase 2: In this phase, a reliability scale was tested with Cronbach’s Alpha coefficient and  
exploratory factor analysis EFA. Data were collected by using completed questionnaires  
distributed randomly to business households at Ho Chi Minh City from June 2020 to July 2020.  
Regarding sample size for factor analysis, the minimum is to have at least five times the number  
of observation variables (Hair, Black, Babin, Anderson, & Tatham, 2006). So, with 20 observation  
variables in this study, the sample size is at least 100. For regression analysis, Tabachnick and  
Fidell (2013) indicated that the sample size, N, should be equal to or exceed 50 + 8p, where p  
equals the number of predictor variables. Therefore, with 5 predictor variables, the sample size is  
at least 90. Moreover, Comrey and Lee (1992) showed about the sample size: very poor for 50  
cases, poor for 100 cases, fair for 200 cases, good for 300 cases, very good for 500 cases, and  
excellent for over 1,000 cases. We chose that the sample size for our study was 200 but we  
enhanced 40% to prevent invalid answering. Therefore, the final of our sample size was 250. Every  
respondent spent about 20 minutes answering the questionnaire. After surveying, we had  
approximately 92% of the collected data. Of those returned, approximately 6% were incomplete.  
Thus, the analysis is based on the 215 usable surveys and represents a response rate of 86% of the  
distributed survey. The questionnaire’s statements were used in this research to measure each  
variable. Variables were measured through the respondent’s perception of tax compliance, Tax  
Knowledge, Tax Rate, Tax Penalty, Personal Norm, and Perceived Fairness (of the tax system).  
Respondent’s perception was measured by using a 5-point Likert scale to determine the  
agreement’s level (1 = highly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = not certain, 4 = agree, 5 = highly agree).  
We coded all data collected and used SPSS 25 to analyze. According to Tabachnick and Fidell  
(2013), to ensure the reliability of the scale is any observational variables with a total correlation  
coefficient greater than 0.3 and Cronbach’s Alpha coefficient greater than 0.6. Based on the  
Eigenvalue, the appropriate factorial analysis, and the observed variables in the whole are  
correlated when the Eigenvalues criteria value is greater than 1. Average Variance Extracted is  
>50%, the KMO coefficient is within 0.5 to 1, Sig. coefficient is <= 5%, the loading factor of all  
observational variables is>0.5 (Hair, Black, Babin, Anderson, & Tatham, 1998).  
Phase 3: We tested the Pearson correlation coefficient. In terms of the strength of the  
relationship, the value of the correlation coefficient varies between +1 and -1, and the sig (2-tailed)  
value is less than or equal to 0.05 (Hair et al., 2006). A correlation of 0 indicates no relationship,  
a correlation of 1 indicates a perfect positive correlation, and a correlation of - 1 indicates a perfect  
negative correlation (Pallant, 2010).  
Phase 4: Multiple linear regression was applied to evaluate the relation between the  
dependent variable and independent variables and to test this study’s hypothesis. The regression  
of our model is:  
TC = 훽0 + 훽1푇퐾 + 훽2푇푆+ 훽3푇퐴+ 훽4푁푂푅푀+훽5푃퐸푅 + 휀  
(1)  
Khuc D. Nam, Nguyen T. B. Minh. Ho Chi Minh City Open University Journal of Science, 11(1), 136-152 141  
Where:  
훽0, 훽1, 훽2, 훽3, 훽4, 훽5 : Coefficients  
TC: Tax Compliance (dependent variable)  
TK: Tax Knowledge  
TR: Tax Rate  
TP: Tax Penalty  
PN: Personal Norm  
PF: Perceived Fairness (of the tax system)  
휀: Classical random error term  
To warrant the reliability of our scale for tax compliance, we adopted from previous  
researches. The research scale is shown in the following Table 1.  
Table 1  
Summary of research scale  
No  
I
Scale  
Symbol  
TK  
Source  
Niemirowski et al.  
(2003); Ngo et al.  
(2019)  
Tax Knowledge  
I understand the rules of the tax law  
TK1  
I understand the regulations relating to  
tax rights and obligations  
TK2  
TK3  
I understand the tax rate that applies to  
my business  
I understand the regulations on tax  
declaration and payment  
TK4  
TR  
Tilahun (2018)  
II Tax Rate  
The tax rate applying to my business is  
TR1  
high  
The tax rate that I’m paying is not  
suitable for my ability  
TR2  
TR3  
The tax rates of my business area are  
higher than in other ones  
I am not satisfied with my tax rate and  
tax fee  
TR4  
TP  
Hasseldine et al.  
(2007); Ngo et al.  
(2019)  
III Tax Penalty  
The tax authority’s ability to detect and  
punish tax fraud and fraud is high  
TP1  
The sanctions for tax non-compliance,  
tax fraud, or tax evasion are very strict  
TP2  
142 Khuc D. Nam, Nguyen T. B. Minh. Ho Chi Minh City Open University Journal of Science, 11(1), 136-152  
No  
Scale  
Symbol  
TP3  
Source  
The fines for tax non-compliance are  
high  
Braithwaite, 2003;  
Wenzel (2003)  
IV Personal Norm  
Tax evasion or tax fraud will be  
PN  
PN1  
condemned by society  
Compliance with tax regulations is right  
with human morality  
PN2  
Tax evasion or tax fraud is shameful and  
wrong  
PN3  
PF  
Tilahun (2018)  
V
Perceived Fairness  
The tax fee that I must pay is fair  
compared to others in the same field  
PF1  
Tax officers treat me fairly like other  
taxpayers  
PF2  
PF3  
I receive fair benefits from Government  
spending  
Ngo et al. (2019)  
VI Tax Compliance  
TC  
I always declare and pay taxes on time  
TC1  
I always make accurate and complete tax  
declaration and payment  
TC2  
TC3  
I always comply with regulations on  
invoices and accounting voucher  
Source: The researcher’s data analysis  
4. Results and discussion  
4.1. Descriptive statistics  
Table 2  
Sample description  
Item  
Frequency  
Percentage  
Gender  
Male  
103  
112  
47.9  
52.1  
Female  
Age  
Under 30  
30 - 40  
40 - 50  
42  
94  
62  
19.5  
43.7  
28.8  
Khuc D. Nam, Nguyen T. B. Minh. Ho Chi Minh City Open University Journal of Science, 11(1), 136-152 143  
Item  
Frequency  
Percentage  
Over 50  
17  
7.9  
Education level  
Under High School  
High School  
Bachelor Degree  
Business type  
Manufacturing  
Trading  
21  
149  
45  
9.8  
69.3  
20.9  
9
4.2  
166  
40  
77.2  
18,6  
Services  
Business experiment  
Under 2 years  
2-5 years  
36  
56  
74  
49  
16.7  
26.1  
34.4  
28.8  
Over 5-10 years  
Over 10 years  
Source: The researcher’s data analysis  
The female group amounted to 112 out of 215 participants or 52.1% of the total answers.  
103 male participants accounted for 47.9% of the total answers.  
The main age-group of our survey-participants was “30-40” which counted for 43.7% of  
the total answers. The second one frequently used answer for the category “age group” was “41-  
50” with 28.8% of the total answers. The minor age group of our participants was “over 50” which  
included 17 out of 215 participants and accounted for 7.9%.  
The major number of participants picked a “high school diploma” as the education level,  
which accounted for 69.3% of the total answers. The second one frequently used answer for the  
category was “bachelor degree” with 45 participants out of 215 (20.9%). The minor education  
level group of our participants was “under high school” which included 21 participants (9.8%).  
There are 3 main business types of individual business households namely manufacturing,  
trading, and services. From the total sample taken, 77.2%, 18.6%, and 4.2% were trading, services,  
and manufacturing respectively.  
The majority of participants had “2-5 years” about the business experience, which  
accounted for 34.4% of the total answers. The second one had “over 5-10 years” with 26.1%. The  
minority of participants had only 16.7% of the total answers.  
144 Khuc D. Nam, Nguyen T. B. Minh. Ho Chi Minh City Open University Journal of Science, 11(1), 136-152  
4.2. Cronbach’s Alpha test for reliability of the scale and exploratory factors analysis  
(EFA)  
Table 3  
The scale reliability test for factors affecting tax compliance of business households in Vietnam  
Scale Mean if  
Item Deleted  
Scale Variance Corrected Item- Cronbach’s Alpha  
Item  
if Item Deleted Total Correlation  
if Item Deleted  
TK1  
TK2  
TK3  
TK4  
11.18  
11.18  
11.27  
11.13  
6.149  
6.588  
5.994  
6.138  
0.670  
0.589  
0.652  
0.679  
0.766  
0.803  
0.775  
0.762  
Cronbach’s Alpha for Tax Knowledge (TK) = 0.823  
TR1  
6.70  
6.71  
6.79  
6.80  
6.399  
6.730  
6.213  
6.684  
0.588  
0.590  
0.679  
0.591  
0.762  
0.759  
0.715  
0.759  
TR 2  
TR 3  
TR 4  
Cronbach’s Alpha for Tax Rate (TR) = 0.799  
TP1  
TP 2  
TP 3  
7.32  
7.29  
7.30  
2.871  
3.122  
2.885  
0.538  
0.485  
0.491  
0.553  
0.621  
0.615  
Cronbach’s Alpha for Tax Penalty (TP) = 0. 690  
PN1  
PN 2  
PN 3  
6.77  
6.73  
6.67  
3.310  
2.971  
3.333  
0.579  
0.621  
0.584  
0.698  
0.651  
0.693  
Cronbach’s Alpha for Personal Norm (PN) = 0.763  
PF1  
PF2  
PF3  
7.21  
7.35  
7.47  
3.225  
2.985  
2.933  
0.646  
0.713  
0.704  
0.804  
0.738  
0.747  
Cronbach’s Alpha for Perceived Fairness (PER) = 0.829  
TC1  
TC2  
TC3  
7.37  
7.34  
7.30  
1.290  
1.309  
1.436  
0.578  
0.645  
0.565  
0.704  
0.625  
0.714  
Cronbach’s Alpha for Tax Compliance (TC) = 0.763  
Source: The researcher’s data analysis  
Table 3 showed that all scales in the second test met reliability requirements. Specially, all  
Cronbach’s Alpha coefficients were greater than 0.6, with a Corrected item-total Correlation  
greater than 0.5. All observed variables consistently measured specific, statistically, and  
Khuc D. Nam, Nguyen T. B. Minh. Ho Chi Minh City Open University Journal of Science, 11(1), 136-152 145  
analytically significant. After that, the scales were evaluated by Exploratory Factor Analysis  
(EFA) to test the unidimensionality of the scales to eliminate inappropriate measurement criteria.  
Table 4  
KMO and Bartlett’s test for factor affecting tax compliance of individual business households in  
the second test  
0.747  
1230,077  
136  
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy.  
Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity  
Approx. Chi-Square  
Df  
0.000  
Sig.  
Pattern Matrix  
Component  
3
1
2
4
5
TK4  
TK3  
TK1  
TK2  
TR3  
TR2  
TR4  
TR1  
PF2  
PF3  
PF1  
PN2  
PN3  
PN1  
TP1  
TP2  
TP3  
0.837  
0.790  
0.761  
0.749  
0.836  
0.802  
0.717  
0.710  
0.883  
0.869  
0.812  
0.833  
0.820  
0.801  
0.814  
0.781  
0.743  
Source: The researcher’s data analysis  
Table 4 showed that all 17 items of five independent factors loaded on five factors with  
Eigenvalues greater than 1, the cumulative percent of 67.309% and KMO values = 0.747>0.5.  
Bartlett’s test is significant at p = 0.000<0.05 for the variables measuring five factors, including  
Tax Knowledge, Tax Rate, Tax Penalty, Personal Norm, and Perceived Fairness (of the tax  
system), which were all appropriate. The observed variables of factors were strongly correlated.  
146 Khuc D. Nam, Nguyen T. B. Minh. Ho Chi Minh City Open University Journal of Science, 11(1), 136-152  
Moreover, all 3 items of the dependent variable loaded on 1 factor with Eigenvalues greater  
than 1, the cumulative percent of 67.971%, KMO values = 0.686>0.5, and Bartlett’s test is  
significant at p = 0.000<0.05. Therefore, exploratory factors analysis was suitable for data and the  
observed variables of factors were strongly correlated.  
4.3. Pearson correlation coefficient analysis  
Table 5  
Pearson correlation matrix for dependent and independent variables  
Variable  
TC  
1
2
3
4
5
6
1
2
3
4
5
6
1
TK  
TR  
TP  
PN  
PF  
0.604**  
-0.550**  
0.376**  
0.285**  
0.158*  
1
-0.418**  
0.127  
1
0.082  
0.040  
0.002  
1
-0.043  
-0.022  
-0.022  
0.082  
1
0.107**  
1
Dependent variable - TC  
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)  
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)  
Source: The researcher’s data analysis  
Table 5 presented the Pearson correlation matrix for dependent and independent variables.  
Results showed that Tax Knowledge (TK), Tax Rate (TR), Tax Penalty (TP), and Personal Norm  
(PN) were significantly correlated with Tax Compliance (TC) at a 1% significant level (as P<0.01),  
while perceived fairness (PF) was significantly correlated with tax compliance (TC) at 5%  
significant level (as P<0.05). Therefore, this result suggested that Tax Knowledge, Tax Rate, Tax  
Penalty, Personal Norm, and Perceived Fairness (of the tax system) were significantly correlated  
with tax compliance.  
4.4. Regression analysis  
Table 6  
Results of multiple regression analysis  
Variable  
(Constant)  
Coefficient  
T
Sig.  
Tolerance  
VIF  
7.906  
9.521  
-10.351  
9.504  
8.299  
2.249  
0.000  
0.000  
0.000  
0.000  
0.000  
0.026  
TK  
0.395  
-0.428  
0.361  
0.313  
0.085  
0.798  
0.806  
0.953  
0.968  
0.962  
1.253  
1.241  
1.049  
1.033  
1.039  
TR  
TP  
PN  
PF  
Model fit  
R
R2  
0.844  
0.713  
Adjusted R2  
0.706  
St. Error  
0.29741  
Khuc D. Nam, Nguyen T. B. Minh. Ho Chi Minh City Open University Journal of Science, 11(1), 136-152 147  
Variable  
Coefficient  
1.983  
T
Sig.  
Tolerance  
VIF  
Durbin-Watson  
F
103.658  
0.000  
Sig.  
Source: The researcher’s data analysis  
Based on Table 6, estimated regression showed that standardized coefficients for Tax  
Knowledge (TK), Tax Rate (TR), Tax Penalty (TP), Personal Norm (PN), and Perceived Fairness  
(PF) were statistically at a 5% level (P-value <0.05). The TK, TP, PN, and PF variables had a  
positive impact on tax compliance while the TR variable had a negative one.  
The adjusted R2 was 0.713 indicating that 71.3% of tax compliance’s variance (dependent  
variable) was explained by the independent variables’ variance. The F statistic in regression (F =  
103.658, p = 0.000) was affirmed at a 1% significant level, indicating that the estimated regression  
was efficient for prediction. Durbin-Watson = 1.983, which was in the acceptable range of 1.5-  
2.5, and the Tolerance value was also in the acceptable range.  
Results also revealed that there was no multicollinearity among the independent variables  
as variance inflation factors (VIF) was also low (less than 1.253). Therefore, the regression model  
for business households’ tax compliance in Vietnam could be established as follows:  
Tax compliance = - 0.428 Tax Rate + 0.395 Tax Knowledge + 0.361 Tax Penalty + 0.313  
(2)  
Personal Norm + 0.085 Perceived Fairness (of the tax system)  
4.5. Hypothesis test of model  
Based on the results of the multiple regression analysis, the result of hypothesis testing was  
shown in Table 7.  
Table 7  
Result of the hypothesis test  
Standardized  
Coefficients Beta  
No.  
H1  
H2  
H3  
H4  
H5  
Hypothesis  
Result  
Tax Knowledge has a positive (+) impact  
on tax compliance  
0.395  
- 0.428  
0.361  
0.313  
0.085  
Accepted  
Accepted  
Accepted  
Accepted  
Accepted  
Tax Rate has a negative (-) impact on tax  
compliance  
Tax Penalty has a positive (+) impact on  
tax compliance  
Personal Norm has a positive (+) impact  
on tax compliance  
Perceived Fairness (of the tax system) has a  
positive (+) impact on tax compliance  
Source: The researcher’s data analysis  
Accordingly, the result of this study, the Tax Rate (β =-0.428) had a negative and strongest  
impact on tax compliance, thus hypothesis H2 is accepted. This is consistent with studies by Hai  
148 Khuc D. Nam, Nguyen T. B. Minh. Ho Chi Minh City Open University Journal of Science, 11(1), 136-152  
and See (2011) and Tilahun (2018). This result also provides evidence that a high tax rate led to  
lower tax compliance of business households in Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam. Therefore,  
decreasing the tax rate for business households can enhance tax compliance of business  
households.  
Regarding Tax Knowledge (β = 0.395), the result of this study shows a significant positive  
impact on tax compliance. Thus, hypothesis H1 is accepted. This result is as like as results of  
Niemirowski et al. (2003); Ngo et al. (2019). This result also suggests that Tax Knowledge is a  
key factor influencing tax compliance of business households. It means that providing and training  
knowledge about tax to business households can help to prevent tax evasion and enhance tax  
compliance of business households.  
Regarding Tax Penalty (β = 0.361) had a significant positive impact on tax compliance.  
Thus, hypothesis H3 is accepted. This result is consistent with Hasseldine et al. (2007) and Ngo et  
al. (2019) that increasing the tax penalties led to increasing tax compliance of business households.  
Regarding Personal Norm (β = 0.313), this study found a positive and significant  
relationship between Personal Norm and tax compliance. Thus, hypothesis H4 is accepted. This  
finding is similar to the following studies Braithwaite (2003); Wenzel (2003) that the more  
developed the moral reasoning or tax ethics, the more likely it is voluntary tax compliance of  
business households.  
Regarding the Perceived Fairness (of the tax system) (β = 0.085), this study found that a  
positive and slight relationship between Perceived Fairness and Tax Compliance. Thus, hypothesis  
H5 is accepted. This result is consistent with Tilahun (2018). The result also suggests that if  
business households think that the tax system is fair, Tax Compliance is more like occur. For  
example, if a business household feels that their tax burden is similar to the same income group,  
their Tax Compliance probably increases.  
6. Conclusions and recommendations  
This paper focuses on identifying determinants affecting Tax Compliance of business  
households in Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam. The results of qualitative research proposed a model  
for Tax Compliance with 5 factors and 17 observed variables: Tax Knowledge, Tax Rate, Tax  
Penalty, Personal Norm, and Perceived Fairness. Quantitative research used a 5-point Likert scale  
to evaluate observed variables. The valid sample size for quantitative research was 215 and SPSS  
25 was used for data processing. The results of EFA showed that 17 observed variables were  
measuring 5 factors as the proposed model. After analyzing regression, Tax Knowledge, Tax  
Penalty, Personal Norm, and Perceived Fairness had a positive relationship with tax compliance  
while the tax rate had a negative one. These determinants are organized according to the level of  
influence from high to low following: Tax Rate, Tax Knowledge, Tax Penalty, Personal Norm,  
and Perceived Fairness respectively.  
According to business households in Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam, the “Tax Rate” had the  
strongest and negative impact. To enhance tax compliance of business households, the tax  
authorities need to reduce tax rates and the local authorities need to improve the responsibility of  
the Local Tax Consultative Council for determining taxable income and tax rate of business  
households and avoiding omitting business households that have not been included in the tax  
administration.  
Because “Tax Knowledge” had a second impact on tax compliance of business households  
in Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam, the government in general and tax authorities, in particular, should  
Khuc D. Nam, Nguyen T. B. Minh. Ho Chi Minh City Open University Journal of Science, 11(1), 136-152 149  
develop professional training programs related to tax laws, tax issues, and modes of tax payment  
and collection for business households. With the help of tax education, business households can  
improve compliance with tax.  
Despite the “Tax Penalty” had the third impact on tax compliance of business households  
in Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam, there are 2 solutions to enhance tax compliance. Firstly, the tax  
authorities need to publicize the list of individual business households having high tax risks and  
tax debts in the media like making with companies in Vietnam. As a result, other business  
households may be more active in tax compliance. Finally, the tax authorities should strictly punish  
those cases that deliberately file incorrect returns or evade tax, or commit tax fraud to increase tax  
compliance of business households.  
“Personal Norm” had a fourth impact with a positive impact on tax compliance of business  
households in Ho Chi Minh City. Therefore, the tax authorities should set up good propaganda  
groups to communicate how to behave correctly about tax and to disapprove non-compliance  
behaviors. Especially, these groups can help business households by sharing tax experiments.  
Moreover, legal education should be included in all level educational programs in Vietnam.  
Although the least impact on tax compliance of business households in Ho Chi Minh City  
was “Perceived Fairness” (of the tax system), there were also some solutions concerning this.  
Firstly, the government must build transparent, non-bureaucratic, and responsible institutions and  
must use the collected tax wisely for the benefits of the public such as good infrastructure facilities.  
Secondly, the tax authorities should assess the taxable income based on the information provided  
by business households and checked by the Local Tax Consultative Council. Finally, the tax  
authorities should consider the available market condition, inflation, and fairness among business  
households. Therefore, the tax authorities and the Local Tax Consultative Council need to  
coordinate closely and work seriously and fairly.  
In conclusion, this study focused on bringing evidence that some determinants do have an  
impact on tax compliance of business households in Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam. However, this  
research also has some limitations. First of the survey ample has trust been limited to 215  
observations conducted in Ho Chi Minh City, so further research can broaden this study to cover  
some other provinces and cities of Vietnam or the whole country. Moreover, this study only  
researched some factors affecting tax compliance. Some other factors need to be considered in  
future further studies, such as tax compliance cost, income level, income source, tax audit, etc.  
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